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Abstract
This study examines the behaviour of fleeting orders before and after two structural changes at the Australian
Securities Exchange (ASX); the removal of broker IDs from the public limit order book and a change in the
price structure of exchange fees. Following Hasbrouck and Saar (2009), fleeting orders are defined as orders
that are revised or cancelled within two seconds. Firstly, this study confirms that fleeting limit order revisions
exhibit similar properties to liquidity-demanding orders. Secondly, after the removal of broker IDs on the
market, traders start to aggressively chase the market price. Thirdly, after the price structure changes, traders
start to use fleeting orders to search for latent liquidity and more often switch from limit orders to market
orders when the cost of immediate execution in the market decreases. This study is important to understand
order dynamics in the current high frequency trading environment.
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This study examines the behaviour of fleeting orders before and after two structural changes at the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX); the removal of broker IDs from the public limit order book and a 
change in the price structure of exchange fees. Following Hasbrouck and Saar (2009), fleeting orders are 
defined as orders that are revised or cancelled within two seconds. Firstly, this study confirms that 
fleeting limit order revisions exhibit similar properties to liquidity-demanding orders. Secondly, after the 
removal of broker IDs on the market, traders start to aggressively chase the market price. Thirdly, after 
the price structure changes, traders start to use fleeting orders to search for latent liquidity and more 
often switch from limit orders to market orders when the cost of immediate execution in the market 





Hasbrouck and Saar (2009, p.146) highlight the importance to recognise “new ways in which trading 
and order choices have changed as a results of improved technology, active trading culture, market 
fragmentation, and an increasing utilization of latent liquidity”. The authors suggest two models. The first 
are dealer models, which are often modelled as risk-neutral liquidity suppliers, who are indifferent as to 
whether their bids and offers are executed, and who let their bids and offers remain in the limit order book 
until there is a trade. The second are strategic models whereby traders decide whether to supply or 
demand liquidity. For example, in the presence of a wide spread, traders with a strong desire to trade 
might rather choose to submit a limit order. 
The authors investigate limit order activity in strategic models and question the traditional view of 
limit orders as patient suppliers of liquidity. In particular, they show that 37% of limit orders traded on 
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NASDAQ through electronic communication network (ECN) are cancelled within two seconds of 
submission. They explain that this is a recent phenomenon, which they refer to as fleeting orders and 
investigate their role in dynamic trading strategies. Similar to Hasbrouck and Saar (2009), this study 
examines the trading behaviour of fleeting orders around unique market structure changes at the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX).  
The market structure changes are as follows; a) the removal of broker IDs from the public limit order 
book, and b) a series of changes in the price structure for exchange fees. The removal of broker IDs was 
implemented on 28 November 2005. The impact of broker anonymity is extensively documented in the 
literature. For example, Foucault, Moinas and Thiessen (2007) examined the effect of broker anonymity 
on Paris Euronext and found that quoted bid-ask spreads decline and quoted depth decreases when broker 
IDs are withheld. Comerton-Forde and Tang (2009) examined market quality when the ASX moved to an 
anonymous regime and found three major improvements in market quality; a) reduction in quoted 
spreads, b) increase in quoted depth and c) greater order flow.  
Broker identifiers provide valuable information in the limit-order book; for example, they explicitly 
offer free information in the trading process (O’Hara 1995). Large (2004) argue that traders who arrive at 
the market uncertain of its state can quickly learn its true state by placing a limit order and watching the 
evolution of the market. If the uncertainty is quickly resolved, limit orders are quickly cancelled. 
Therefore, fleeting orders are used as part of an optimal strategy. The author argues that uncertainty can 
increase the placement of limit orders, since the option to cancel reduces downside risk, while the upside 
potential remains.  
Foucault et al. (2007) explain, because in anonymous markets, uninformed traders cannot distinguish 
informative orders from non-informative orders, their bidding behaviour is driven by their belief about the 
identity of the traders with orders in the limit order book. The authors confirm that the removal of broker 
IDs affects the liquidity of a limit order market. In particular, they find a significant decrease in various 
measures of the quoted spread and effective spread after the switch to an anonymous limit order book. 
Overall the authors suggest that the switch to anonymity has improved market liquidity and agree that the 
limit order book contains information on the magnitude of future price changes. However, a switch to 
anonymity reduces the informativeness of the bid-ask spread when it improves market liquidity. 
The removal of broker IDs is an excellent opportunity to examine fleeting orders. Especially because 
uninformed traders are not able to identify informed traders in anonymous markets, and as a results 
fleeting orders may be used as a vehicle for uninformed traders to learn about expected future price 
movement.  
The ASX announced a range of enhancements to the trade execution service that was implemented on 
28 June 2010.1 In particular, headline trade execution fee is reduce from 0.28 basis points to 0.15 bps, on-
market crossing and off-market crossing execution fees are reduce from 0.15 bps to 0.10 bps, and from 
0.075 bps to 0.05 bps respectively. In addition, new order types are introduced. These are undisclosed 
orders and CentrePoint crossing orders.2 Undisclosed orders are undisclosed to the general market as to 
volume, but disclosed as to price - provided the order size is above a specified threshold of AU$500,000. 
CentrePoint Orders are anonymous orders that enable execution at the prevailing midpoint of the best bid 
and offer of the Central Limit Order Book (CLOB).3 This reduction in ASX fees lowered the direct costs 
of trading for ASX participants, while the new systems and order type functionality were introduced with 
the intention to lower market impact costs such as price slippage. These are all initiatives taken by ASX 
to attract and retain algorithmic trading business by creating a favourable environment for it.  
These enhancements to trade execution service are another opportunity to examine the role of fleeting 
orders. Firstly because the reduction in exchange fees make it more affordable to frequently submit, 
revise and cancel orders. Secondly the introduction of new order types such as undisclosed orders can 
increase the use of fleeting orders in dynamic trading strategies. For example, traders place a limit order 
within the spread with the intention of immediate execution against an undisclosed order. If immediate 
execution does not occur, the limit order is quickly revised at a more aggressive price to ensure execution 
against a hidden order. 
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This study examines; a) the characteristics of limit order book, b) what happen to limit orders after 
submission, c) the market conditions that influence the probability of fleeting and non-fleeting orders and 
d) the role of fleeting orders in dynamic trading strategies.  
Similar to Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) this study proposes three hypotheses to explain the use of 
fleeting orders in dynamic trading strategies. These are as follows; a) Chase hypothesis - this hypothesis 
states that fleeting orders arise as traders chase prices that are moving away by cancelling the existing 
orders and repricing their orders; b) Search hypothesis - this hypothesis states that fleeting orders are used 
to search for hidden liquidity in the book; and c) Cost-of-immediacy hypothesis - this hypothesis states 
that fleeting orders arise when existing limit orders are cancelled to be resubmitted as marketable orders.  
The results reveal several interesting results. These are as follows; a) The percentage of limit orders 
that are fully executed decreases after both market structure changes. This is consistent with Hasbrouck 
and Saar (2009) who find a low fill rate for INET. They explain that this indicates the importance to 
recognise new ways in which trading and order choices have changed due to technology, active trading, 
fragmentation, and latent liquidity. b) Large market capitalisation stocks, in both market structure changes 
show that the most probable event 2 seconds after a limit order is submitted or revised is a subsequent 
revision. This confirms that traders who arrive at the market uncertain of its state quickly learn its true 
state by placing a limit order and watching the evolution of the market. If the uncertainty is quickly 
resolved, limit orders are quickly cancelled or revised. c) Large market capitalisation stocks, after both 
market structure changes show that fleeting cancellations are mostly placed at-the-market. Before and 
after the removal of broker IDs, fleeting revisions are mostly placed behind-the-market. However, before 
the price structure change, fleeting revisions are mostly placed behind-the-market and after the price 
structure change, fleeting revisions are mostly placed ahead-of-the-market. d) The behaviour of limit 
order revisions that are subsequently revised (within 2 seconds) behaves more like market orders that 
demands liquidity. e) After the removal of broker IDs, traders pursue a dynamic strategy in which they 
revise limit orders as the market moves away from the original limit order. After the price structure 
change, fleeting orders are used to search for latent liquidity within the spread and traders more often 
switch from a limit order to a market order as it becomes cheaper to demand than to supply liquidity.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The study of limit order revisions in the ASX has recently witnessed growing interest. Liu (2009), 
and Fong and Liu (2010) offers valuable characterizations of order revisions. Liu (2009) proposes that the 
decision to cancel a limit order is a function of; a) the risk of a being picked off by traders that are more 
informed and b) the risk of a non-execution because the price moves away from the trader. The use of 
computers in the trading process has enabled limit order traders to monitor their limit orders more closely. 
Thereby, making more strategic decisions to place, cancel or revise orders to reduce pick off risk or non-
execution risk. Fong and Liu (2010) empirically test the relation between limit order revisions, the 
management of free trading options, non-execution risks and monitoring costs. They suggest, alleviating 
the risk of being picked-off or the risk of non-execution, traders can monitor the market and cancel or 
revise orders accordingly. They find that order revision activity is higher when order submission risks are 
higher, when spreads are narrower, and when the concerned firm is larger. 
Yeo (2005) investigates the motivation behind cancellations and test two trading strategies that 
accordingly to them, accounts for up to 85% of all cancellations on NYSE. The first strategy is an order 
splitting strategy, were a limit order trader wishes to hide large buying or selling orders by breaking it into 
smaller ones. The second strategy is when more than one trader submits limit orders to gain price priority 
over one another within a short time interval. This is referred to as the “undercutting strategy” Yeo (2005, 
p.11). Unsuccessful traders are faced with the following options; a) cancel their orders and resubmit with 
the intention of further undercutting or b) exit the market altogether. Yeo (2005) finds that; a) most 
traders withdraw from trading in the stock subsequent to cancellation, b) if they choose to continue to 
trade, they are much more likely to resubmit their orders with more aggressively priced limit orders rather 
than market orders.  
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Cao et al. (2008) examine whether and to what extent the state of order book affects investors’ order 
placement strategies. The state of the book includes its depth (i.e. quantity) and its height (i.e. price 
dimension along the book). In addition to the choice of using market or limit orders, they differentiate 
among limit orders according to their position in the book. They find that the top of the book always 
affects order submissions, cancellations, and revisions, and the rest of the book predominantly affects 
order cancellations and revisions. Further evidence linking order cancellations and monitoring costs is 
found in Boehmer, Saar and Yu (2005). They document an increase in the intensity of limit order 
cancellations and a decrease in time-to-cancellations after the introduction of NYSE's OpenBook. The 
relation between order revisions and free-option risk is also documented by Biais et al. (1995). They find 
that after large sales (buys), which convey negative (positive) information, the rate of cancellations 
increases on the buy (sell) side of the book.  
Closely related to this study, Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) examine the behaviour of fleeting orders in 
dynamic trading strategies. They argue that fleeting orders exhibits different characteristics than limit 
orders that remain in the limit order book for more than two seconds. They emphasise the complex nature 
of liquidity provision and how it has changed from the previous decade. Several interesting questions that 
arise from Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) are for example: Has the cancellation rate increased or decreased 
over time? How does different market structure and markets, affect the cancellation rate?  
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. The next section provides institutional 
background and data, Section 4 outlines the hypotheses that are tested, Section 6 discusses the research 
design, Section 7 presents the empirical analysis and Section 8 concludes. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND DATA 
 
The ASX is a centralised electronic limit order book market that takes place on an Integrated Trading 
System (ITS). Traders may enter, revise or cancel orders in the trading system from the pre-open phase 
commencing at 7:00; however, the trading system does not match orders until the market opens. The 
opening call auction algorithm starts at 10:00 and completes the opening procedure of all stocks by 10:10. 
Normal continuous trading follows the opening call auction and ends at 16:00. The closing call auction 
algorithm operates at 16:10 to establish the closing price of the day. 
The market structure changes that are examined are as follows; a) the removal of broker IDs from the 
public limit order book, and b) a series of changes in the price structure for exchange fees.  
Since the beginning of the electronic screen trading via SEATS, brokers have been able to identify in 
real-time the broker identification number associated with the order in the central limit order book 
(CLOB) for each security. Since 28 November 2005, all equity trading on ASX has been anonymous, i.e., 
broker identifiers are not displayed.    
The ASX announced a range of enhancements to the trade execution service offering. A reduction in 
trade execution fees and the introduction of new order types were implemented 28 June 2010.4 In 
particular, trade execution fee was reduce from 0.28 basis points to 0.15 bps and on-market crossing and 
off-market crossing execution fees was reduced from 0.15 bps to 0.10 bps and from 0.075 bps to 0.05 bps 
respectively. New order types introduced, were undisclosed and CentrePoint crossing orders5.  
The dataset used in this study is limit order book data provided by the Securities Industry Research 
Centre of Asia Pacific (SIRCA). The limit order book data contain details on every order submitted to the 
ASX, including the order type (order submission, order revision, order cancellation), the date and time to 
the nearest hundredth of a second, stock code, order price, order volume and order direction (buy or sell 
order). Each new order is assigned a unique identification number (ID), which allows for the tracking of 
every order from its initial submission through to any revision, cancellation or execution. This dataset 
also contains information regarding whether the order is partially revealed. In addition, intraday bid-ask 
quotes are obtained from SIRCA. This dataset provide information on stock code, date, time to the nearest 
hundredth of a second, and the best bid and ask quotes in the limit order book.  
ASX 200 companies are ranked according to their equity market capitalisation from August 2005 to 
September 2010. These companies are divided into quartiles, from which the first 20 companies within 
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each quartile are selected, thereby obtaining a size-stratified subsample of 80 stocks from among 200 
stocks. The period includes 3 months before and 3 months after each market design change. Therefore, 
the removal of broker IDs includes period between August 2005 and February 2006, and price structure 
change includes a period between March 2010 and September 2010.   
Table 1 presents summary statistics of S&P 200 stocks that are ranked based on equity market 
capitalisation. These statistics are the average number of daily trades, the average daily volume, the 
average daily closing price, the standard deviation of the daily returns and average relative spread. Panel 
A presents statistics before and after the removal of broker IDs. Large market capitalisation stocks show 
an average of 1019 trades per day and an average volume of 2,332 (thousand) per day. Small market 
capitalisation stocks show an average of 61 trades per day and an average volume of 395 (thousand) per 





This table presents summary statistics of S&P200 stocks that are ranked based on equity market capitalisation. For 
each quartile the top 20 stocks are included. Q1 presents large market capitalisation stocks and Q4 presents small 
market capitalisation stocks. Panel A and B presents descriptive statistics 3 months before and 3 months after the 
removal of broker IDs and the change price structure, respectively. The removal of broker IDs is implemented on 28 
November 2005 and price structure change is implemented on 28 June 2010. The following variables are calculated: 
market cap is the average market capitalisation, number of trades is the average number of daily trades, daily 
volume is the average daily volume, price is the average daily closing price, std ret is the standard deviation of the 
daily returns and relative spread is the daily average relative spread. This table presents cross-sectional summary 
statistics. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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structure change. Large market capitalisation stocks show an average of 5,787 trades per day with an 
average volume of 3,313(thousand) per day. Small market capitalisation stocks show an average of 1,120 
trades per day with an average volume of 1,528 (thousand) per day.   
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the average number and size of limit-, market-, cancelled - and 
revised orders. Panel A presents statics for the removal of broker IDs and Panel B presents statistics for 
price structure change. Large market capitalisation stocks, before the removal of broker IDs show an 
average of approximately 17,372 limit orders and 12,781 market orders per day. After the removal of 
broker IDs, limit orders increase to 19,078 and market orders increases to 14,095 per day. Furthermore, 
after the removal of broker IDs, the number of limit order revisions increased from 10,629 to 14,703 per 
day, while the number of market cancellation slightly increases from 5,709 to 6,735 per day.  
Large market capitalisation stocks, before the price structure change show an average of 
approximately 213,208 limit orders per day, which increases to 225,040 after the price structure change. 
In addition, market orders before the price structure change show an average of 52,560 orders per day, 
which increases to 54,818 after the price structure change. Large market capitalisation stocks before the 
price structure change show an average of 218,916 revisions and 106,437 cancellations per day, which 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Following Hasbrouck and Saar (2009), the hypothesis tested are; chase –, search – and the cost of 
immediacy hypothesis. These hypotheses are tested pre- and post- each market structure change in ASX.  
 
Hypothesis1.1: Trader revises and re-submits limit order at a more aggressive price as the 
market moves away from the original limit price. Limit order revision and re-submission 
increases after each market structure change.   
 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) refer to this hypothesis as chase hypothesis. The proposition of this 
hypothesis is that the trader actively influences the likelihood of an execution by using fleeting orders in 
dynamic strategies in response to changing market conditions. 
 
Hypothesis1.2: Trader cancels limit order and switch to a market order, in response to a 
drop in the cost of immediate execution. Limit order cancellation increases after each 
market structure change.   
 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) refer this as the cost-of-immediacy hypothesis. This hypothesis states that 
fleeting orders are part of a dynamic strategy in which traders cancel a limit order and switch to a market 
order when the cost of immediate execution in the market decreases. Similar to previous hypothesis, this 
hypothesis specifically state that fleeting orders are a by-product of dynamic strategies involving order 
revision in response to changing market conditions. 
 
Hypothesis1.3: Trader submits limit order within the spread to achieve immediate 
execution against a hidden order or attracting a new marketable order. If neither occurs 
within a brief interval, the limit order is revised. Limit order revision increases after each 
market structure change.   
 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) refer to this hypothesis as search hypothesis.  This hypothesis states that 
fleeting orders are outcomes of strategies that seek latent liquidity. Hasbrouck and Saar (2009, p.144) 
explain that the term “latent” comprise hidden limit orders that are available for execution but are not 
displayed. It also extend to counterparties who are actively monitoring the market and will immediately 
hit an aggressively priced limit order, but who are unwilling to pre-commit to a price of limit order that is 
either displayed or not.  
In particular, this hypothesis states that fleeting orders are intended to demand, rather than supply, 
liquidity. It is less aggressive than a market order strategy, but it is not a patient limit order. The trader 




Fill Rate of Limit Orders 
In this section, the percentage of limit order submissions, executions, partially executions and fully 
executions are determined. Limit order IDs are used to track limit orders until execution. Thus, if the 
volume of limit order at submission equals the total volume of all trades executed (with the same order 
ID) then the limit order is fully executed, else partially executed.  
The percentage of limit orders submitted is calculated as the number of limit orders that are 
submitted, divided by the sum of limit and market orders submitted. The percentage of limit orders 
executed is calculated as the number of limit orders that are executed, divided by the total number of limit 
orders submitted. Fully and partially executed orders are calculated as the proportion of limit order that 
are executed. Table 3 reports the cross-sectional averages for the percentage of limit orders submitted, 
executed, fully executed and partially executed. 
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Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) argue that in the presence of fleeting orders, the fill rate is a misleading 
and inappropriate metric of quality. They explain “a higher fill rate indicates a greater likelihood of 
finding counterparty and therefore a better market”. (e.g. Hasbrouck and Saar, 2009, p.146) However, 
they find that the fill rate for INET is low, yet it is a highly successful venue that ultimately chosen by 
Nasdaq as its primary platform. They emphasise that this finding indicates the importance to recognise the 
new ways in which trading and order choices have changed due to technology, active trading, 
fragmentation, and latent liquidity.  
 
Survival Analysis 
The survival analysis is used to determine what happens to limit orders after submission. More 
specifically, the life-table method is used to estimate the survival function, where the distribution of 
survival times is divided into a certain number of intervals. For each interval the number and proportion 
of events that entered the respective interval, the number and proportion of events that failed in the 
respective interval and the number of cases that were lost or censored in the respective interval are 
computed. In the estimation process for cancellations and revisions the censoring event is execution (and 
vice versa).  
The time intervals are measured from the submission of limit order to the subsequent event and from 
the revision of limit order to the subsequent event, i.e. revision, cancellation or execution. The 
probabilities are computed as 1−S(t), where S(t) is the survival function. Let λ denote the time between 
order submission (or revision) and cancellation, revision or execution. The probability of cancellation or 
revision in the interval (0, )t  is the distribution function ( ) Pr( )eventP t tλ= ≤ . The probabilities are 
estimated separately for each stock. Table 4 reports the cross-sectional averages for cancellation, revision 
and execution probability.  
 
Placement of Fleeting Orders 
In this section, the placement of limit orders are examined, to determine whether fleeting orders are 
placed ahead, at or behind the same-side best bid and offer prices (BBO). For example ahead of same-side 
BBO, for a buy means that it was submitted at a price that is higher than the best bid. If a limit order has 
more than two revisions and the price has change since submission, then the updated price will be use to 
determine whether the subsequent order (i.e. fleeting or non-fleeting revision or cancellation) is placed 
ahead, at or behind the market.  
First, the percentage of fleeting and non-fleeting cancellations and revisions is calculated relative to 
each group (i.e. fleeting and non-fleeting). Second, fleeting and non-fleeting revisions and cancellation 
are then sub-classified by the location of the limit order price, relative to the same-side BBO at the time 
the order was submitted or revised. The sub-classifications are; a) ahead of BBO, b) at BBO, c) behind 
BBO. The percentage of each sub-classification is reported, which sum vertically to 100% within each 
category. Table 5 reports the cross-sectional averages.  
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) show that  approximately 36% of fleeting orders are priced ahead of the 
same-side INET best bid or offer (BBO), while only 20.73% of non-fleeting cancelled limit orders are 
priced ahead of the BBO. In other words, fleeting orders are priced more aggressively. They suggests, 
submitting a limit order at a slightly better price may be to  a) jump to the head of the queue, or b) it could 
indicate a search for hidden orders whereby the searcher first tries the most favourable price and then 
sequentially searches for hidden orders at worse prices. 
 
Multinomial Logit Analysis 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) explain, if fleeting orders behave different to limit orders that  remains in 
the book for more than two seconds (i.e. regular limit orders), further examination of fleeting orders 
would be meaningless. Similar to Hasbrouck and Saar (2009), the multinomial logit model is adopted to 
confirm a meaningful partition of the limit order set. In essence, the multinomial logit, predicts the 
probabilities of different possible outcomes of a categorically distributed dependent variable.  
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The logit model is estimated twice. The first estimation examines the behaviour of fleeting revisions 
and cancelations directly after submission, while the second examines the behaviour of fleeting revisions 
and cancelations directly after revision. The events (categories) in the first estimation are as follows: a) 
limit orders that are cancelled within two seconds b) limit orders that are revised within two seconds, c) 
limit orders that are executed within two seconds, d) limit orders that persist on the book for more than 
two seconds (‘regular limit orders’), and e) market orders. Regular limit orders are the reference event. 
The events in the second estimation are as follows: a) limit orders that are cancelled within two 
seconds, b) limit orders that are revised within two seconds, c) limit orders that are executed within two 
seconds, and d) limit orders revisions that persist in the book for more than two seconds (‘regular limit 
order revisions’). In this case, regular limit orders revisions are the   reference event. 
This model is estimated for large (Q1) and small (Q4) market capitalisation stocks. The period 
examined is a combined period of 6 months, that includes 3 months before and 3 months after the 
removal of broker IDs and the price structure change. The sample is comprised of stocks i and events for 
each stock marked at t. Within each stock, a lower value of the index t represents an earlier event than one 
with a higher value of t.  Hasbrouck and Saar (2009, p.157) explain that these events are essentially 
asynchronous across stocks even though the data for all stocks is taken from the same overall time period. 
For example, the event marked for one stock generally does not take place at the same instant as the event 
for a different stock. 
The explanatory variables are intended to capture dynamic variation in market conditions. These are; 
a) prevailing spread, which reflects the cost of obtaining immediacy in the market, b) volume and 
volatility (absolute value of return) over the prior five minutes, which are intended to capture the variation 
in  momentum of market activity and c) time-of-day dummy variables, which are intended to capture 
deterministic intraday patterns. The spread, lagged volume and lagged absolute value of return are 
standardised within each firm to have zero mean and unit variance. 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) suggests, to assist with the interpretation of this model, the base case is 
calculated. The base case is the implied event probability when all explanatory variables are set to their 
means.6 The implied probabilities are then examined when each of the variables, taken one at a time, 
increases by one standard deviation. Table 4 reports  a) the base case and b) the difference relative to the 
base case when each explanatory variable increased by one standard deviation. Standard errors are 
computed, using the delta method. In addition, the inclusion of the firm-dummies ensures that the average 
(within stock) residuals are essentially zero.   
Let , ,i j tπ be the probability that event t for firm i has outcome j. The reference event is j = 0, that is, a 
regular limit order. The multinomial logit model can be written as:  
 
, ,
, ,0 , ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 , , ,4 , , ,4 , , ,4 , ,




i j t FirstHour MidDay LastHour Change
i j i j j j j j i j t j i j t j i j t j i j t
i t i ti t
lagged lagged




   
= + + + + + + +   
     
(1) 
 
where  ,i jd is a dummy variable set to 1 for firm i and outcome j.  The dummy variable , ,
FirstHour
i j td  is set to 1 
if the time is between 10:10 AM and 11:10 AM; , ,
MidDay
i j td is set to 1 between 11:10 AM and 3:00 PM; and 
, ,
LastHour
i j td is set to 1 between 3:00 PM and 4:00 PM. The dummy variable , ,
Change
i j td  is equal to 0, three 
months before the event, and equal to 1, three months after the event. Lagged volume and lagged absolute 
return are cumulated over the last five minutes preceding the event. Spread is the prevailing relative 
spread.   
 
Duration Model for Limit Order Cancellation and Revisions 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009, p.160) explain that neither the pricing investigation nor the logit model 
directly characterise how market conditions after limit order submission affect the cancellation choice. 
They propose the proportional hazards duration model with time varying covariates (e.g. Allison, 1995). 
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Following Hasbrouck and Saar (2009), the same statistical framework is adopted. In this context, fleeting 
orders include both cancellations and revisions. 
The duration model directly test search-, chase- and cost-of-immediacy- hypothesis before and after 
each market structure change. The event of interest is cancellation and revision within two seconds and 
execution are viewed as the competing processes. Let T denote the cancellation or revision time of an 
order in response to changing market conditions. The survival function is S (t) = Pr (T>t). The hazard rate 
is the intensity of cancellation and revision over the next instant and it is formally written as follows:  
 
1 '





For limit order i of company j, the hazard rate is modelled with semi-parametric form. It is written as 
follows:      
, ,
, 0,( ) ( ) i j t j
X





The hazard for a company j at time t is the product of two factors. These are the baseline hazard 
function ( )0, tjλ  that is left unspecified, and a linear function of a set of exponential covariates , ,Xi j t . The 
components of , ,Xi j t are known as of time t, but need not be known at the time the order is submitted. 
The coefficients are estimated in a partial-likelihood framework wherein the baseline hazard rate is left 
unspecified.  
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where ,# i jfleeing orders , ,i jlagged return , ,i jlagged volume  and ,i jRelative Spread  are explanatory variables. 
The number of fleeting orders in the ten seconds prior to order submission is used to search for evidence 
of dynamic trading strategies, involving multiple rapid cancellations. Volume and volatility (absolute 
value of return) in the prior five minutes and relative spread are used to control for market conditions. 
These variables are standardized (within each stock) to have zero mean and unit variance. Re, lativei jp , , ,samei j tq∆  
and  sin, ,oppo gi j tq∆  directly test the three hypotheses.  
The variable definitions below present the three hypotheses. These definitions are constructed for a 
limit buy order. Limit sell orders is defined in an analogous fashion to limit buy order. 
 
Search hypothesis Chase hypothesis Cost-of-immediacy hypothesis 
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∆ ≡  
0t =  time at submission 
 





Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) explain that the incorporation of time varying covariates mimics the 




i j tq∆ . Hasbrouck and Saar (2009, p 162) argues that “a price movement away from the limit price 
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increase a trader’s propensity to cancel, and also decreases the likelihood of execution. By incorporating 
post-submission conditioning information, these effects are brought into the model.” 
Execution and cancellation (revision) times are competing processes were one process is explicitly 
modelled, and the other is taken as a censoring process. The censoring process is independent of the 
modelled event. The model is estimated separately for each stock where limit orders are tracked through 
the first two seconds from submissions (or revisions). Similar to the logit model, we estimate the model 
for large (Q1) and small (Q4) market capitalisation stocks. Table 7 reports mean and median coefficients 
across stocks. Two methods are used to evaluate the strength of the results; the first reports t-tests for the 
sample’s mean and median coefficients, which take into account cross-sectional variability in the 
estimated coefficient. The second reports the number of positive and negative coefficients, and, the 
number of positive and negative coefficients that are significantly different from zero using the standard 
errors of the stock-specific coefficients. These tests assume that the sample durations are independent 
over time and across firms. Therefore additional tests are required to validate these assumption. To assess 
the independence across firms, the cross sectional properties of (martingale) residuals are examined. To 
assess the independence over time, hourly mean residual are constructed and the correlations between all 




Fill Rate of Limit Orders 
Table 3 reports the percentage of limit orders that are submitted, executed, fully executed and 
partially executed.  Panel A and B presents results 3 months before and 3 months after the removal of 
broker IDs and price structure change, respectively. The percentage of limit orders that are submitted 
marginally increases after each market structure change. More specifically, the results in Panel A show, 
for large market capitalisation stocks, before the removal of broker IDs, of the 53% of the limit orders that 
were executed, 15% were partially executed and 38% were fully executed. After the removal of broker 
IDs, the percentage of limit orders executed decreases by approximately 1%. This reduction is mainly due 
to a reduction in limit orders that are fully executed. 
The results in Panel B, for large market capitalisation stocks show, before price structure change, of 
the 39% of the limit orders that were executed, 6% were partially executed and 33% were fully executed. 
After the price structure change, of the 36% of the limit orders that were executed, 4% were partially 
executed and 32% were fully executed. 
Overall the results show, after the removal of broker IDs, the percentage of limit orders that are 
executed, partially executed and fully executed marginally decreases. After the price structure change, the 
percentage limit orders that are executed decreases by approximately 3%, of which 2% is a reduction in 
limit orders that are partially executed and 1% is a reduction in limit orders that are fully executed. The 
reduction in  limit orders that are fully executed is consistent Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) that find a low 
fill rate for INET and explain that this finding indicate the importance to recognise new ways in which 
trading and order choices due to technology, active trading, fragmentation, and latent liquidity.  
Although the purpose of this analysis is to examine the statistics before and after each market 
structure change, it is worth noting the large reduction of limit orders executed in the period before and 
after price structure change, when compared to the period before and after the removal of broker ID. For 
example, after the price structure change, the results show a decrease of 17% in limit orders that are 
executed. This result confirms, after the price structure change, traders have less intention to let their bids 
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TABLE 3 
LIMIT ORDER SUBMISSION FREQUENCY AND FILL RATES 
 
This table presents summary statistics of the percentage limit orders submitted, executed, fully executed and 
partially executed. Results are reported in quartiles were Q1 presents large market capitalisation stocks and Q4 
presents small market capitalisation stocks. Limit orders submitted, is calculated as the number of limit orders 
submitted divided by the sum of limit orders and market orders. Executed, is calculated as the number of limit order 
executed divided by the total of limit order submitted. Fully executed and partially executed are calcu lated as a 
proportion of executed orders. For example, fully executed, is calculated as the percentage of fully executed times 
the percentage executed orders. Panel A presents statistics 3 months before and 3 months after the removal of b roker 
IDs. Panel B presents statistics 3 months before and 3 months after the change in price structure. These statistics are 
the average of variables across stocks in each quartile.  Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Survival Analysis 
Table 4 presents the cross-sectional average for execution, cancellation and revision probability by 
2sec, 10sec, 1min, 10min and 1 hour. The results in Panel A are as follow, a) By 2 seconds, large market 
capitalisation stocks, after the removal of broker IDs show that limit order revisions and cancellations 
slightly increases and limit order executions slightly decreases. Limit order cancellations are the least 
probable event, followed by limit order executions, and limit order revisions are the most probable event. 
In addition, the probabilities for revision, cancellation and execution, across market capitalisation stocks 
monotonically decreases. After the removal of Broker ID, approximately 6 % of limit orders are executed 
by 2 sec. b) By 1 minute, the probability of limit order revisions and cancellations, for large market 
capitalisation stocks, from before- to after- the removal of broker IDs, increases from 3.5% to 7.2% and 
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2.9% to 3.9%, respectively. After the removal of Broker IDs, approximately 11% of limit orders are 
executed by 1 min. 
Turning to Panel B the following results are: a) By 2 seconds, large market capitalisation stocks, after 
price structure change show that approximately 19% of limit orders are revised, 9% are cancelled and 4% 
are executed. Limit order executions are the least probable event. Small market capitalisation stocks (Q4) 
show, approximately 9% of limit orders is revised, 8% is cancelled and 1% is executed. After the price 
structure change, approximately 2% of limit orders are executed by 2 sec. b) By 1 minute, the probability 
of limit order revisions and cancellations, for large market capitalisation stocks, from before to after the 
price structure change, increases from 25.3% to 32.8 % and 11.11% to 17.70%, respectively. After the 
price structure change, approximately 6% of limit orders are executed by 1 min. Overall the results show, 
for large market capitalisation stocks, in both market structure changes, show that the most probably 
event 2 seconds after a limit order is submitted or revised is a subsequent revision. However, this is more 
apparent after the price structure change. In addition, after the price structure change, limit order 
executions are the least probably event. For example, the probability of limit order execution is only 4% 
in comparison to the probability of limit order revisions of 19%. The shorter survival rates of fleeting 
orders after the removal of broker IDs is likely due to a combination of  a) there being a greater 
opportunity for the algorithms to remain undetected, and b) a greater presence of informed limit orders in 
the orderbook to take the other side of the algorithmic trades. In a transparent order book these limit 




CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY OF LIMIT ORDER REVISIONS,  
CANCELLATION AND EXECUTION 
 
This table presents cumulative probabilit ies for limit order revisions, cancelations and executions by 2sec, 10sec, 
1min, 10min and 1 hour of submission. Results are reported in quartiles. Q1 presents large market capitalisation 
stocks and Q4 presents small market cap italisation stocks. The probabilit ies are computed as 1−S( t), where S(t) is 
the survival function. The survival function is estimated using the life-table. In the estimation process for 
cancellations and revisions, the censored event are executions (and vice versa). Panel A presents statistics for the 
removal of b roker IDs and Panel B fo r price structure change.  
 
  Pre-Event Post-Event 
Event Mkt Cap  2 s 10 s 1 m 10 m  1 hour 2 s 10 s 1 m 10 m 1 hour 
Panel A: Removal of Broker IDs  
Revision 
Q1 0.020 0.035 0.049 0.245 0.467 0.033 0.053 0.072 0.290 0.517 
Q2 0.015 0.014 0.024 0.155 0.364 0.024 0.012 0.021 0.162 0.398 
Q3 0.007 0.014 0.022 0.101 0.247 0.011 0.019 0.028 0.132 0.325 
Q4 0.002 0.009 0.015 0.080 0.204 0.003 0.009 0.017 0.102 0.259 
Cancellation 
Q1 0.016 0.029 0.040 0.150 0.267 0.017 0.029 0.039 0.157 0.280 
Q2 0.018 0.037 0.047 0.196 0.337 0.016 0.029 0.040 0.185 0.319 
Q3 0.011 0.022 0.031 0.197 0.335 0.013 0.023 0.032 0.164 0.287 
Q4 0.006 0.015 0.021 0.199 0.328 0.010 0.016 0.023 0.157 0.272 
Execution 
Q1 0.021 0.066 0.110 0.390 0.628 0.020 0.063 0.105 0.379 0.619 
Q2 0.017 0.038 0.061 0.225 0.463 0.013 0.033 0.053 0.203 0.430 
Q3 0.011 0.027 0.043 0.170 0.394 0.009 0.023 0.037 0.154 0.366 
Q4 0.009 0.020 0.031 0.131 0.324 0.006 0.016 0.026 0.117 0.302 
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  Pre-Event Post-Event 
Event Mkt Cap  2 s 10 s 1 m 10 m  1 hour 2 s 10 s 1 m 10 m 1 hour 
Panel B: Price structure change      
Revision 
Q1 0.112 0.253 0.327 0.611 0.7444 0.191 0.252 0.328 0.615 0.752 
Q2 0.090 0.179 0.232 0.488 0.6491 0.080 0.160 0.212 0.476 0.645 
Q3 0.073 0.137 0.179 0.420 0.592 0.076 0.137 0.180 0.437 0.6071 
Q4 0.08 0.142 0.182 0.423 0.6112 0.091 0.151 0.193 0.432 0.6138 
Cancellation 
Q1 0.079 0.111 0.146 0.369 0.5581 0.093 0.157 0.177 0.465 0.558 
Q2 0.076 0.111 0.137 0.323 0.5108 0.090 0.125 0.157 0.339 0.517 
Q3 0.075 0.110 0.136 0.277 0.4467 0.080 0.133 0.158 0.305 0.476 
Q4 0.068 0.092 0.110 0.269 0.4647 0.084 0.110 0.142 0.302 0.484 
Execution 
Q1 0.042 0.093 0.135 0.411 0.6041 0.041 0.089 0.129 0.395 0.582 
Q2 0.037 0.063 0.083 0.249 0.4543 0.034 0.058 0.077 0.235 0.436 
Q3 0.025 0.041 0.053 0.165 0.351 0.025 0.039 0.051 0.161 0.342 
Q4 0.014 0.053 0.068 0.209 0.4156 0.019 0.047 0.063 0.201 0.410 
 
 
Placement of Fleeting Orders 
Table 5 reports the placement of fleeting and non-fleeting limit revisions and cancellations. The 
placement of limit orders are determined by the location of the limit order price, relative to the same-side 
BBO, at the time the order was submitted or revised. Panel A presents the placements of limit orders 
before and after the removal of broker IDs and Panel B, before and after the price structure change. Panel 
A reports the following results; a) for large market capitalisation stocks,  fleeting cancellation are mostly 
placed at-the-market. For example, after the removal of broker IDs, large market capitalisation stocks 
show that 54% of fleeting cancellations take place at-the-market, whereas small market capitalisation 
stocks show that 50% of fleeting cancellations takes place at-the-market, b) Most importantly, after the 
removal of broker ID, fleeting revisions that are placed behind-the-market decreases by approximately 
6% and fleeting revisions that are placed ahead-of-the-market increases by approximately 11%. However, 
this increase, the majority of fleeting revisions is still placed behind-the-market. Non-fleeting cancellation 




PLACEMENT OF LIMIT ORDER CANCELLATION AND REVISIONS 
 
This table presents summary statistic of the placement of fleeting and non-fleeting revisions and cancellations across 
quartiles. Q1 presents large market capitalisation stocks and Q4 presents small market capitalisation stocks. Panel A 
present statistics before and after the removal of broker IDs, and Panel B presents statistics before and after the price 
structure change. The first line in each quartile reports % Orders, this is the average percentage of fleeting and non-
fleeting cancelations and revisions, relative to each group (i.e. fleeting and non-fleeting). The remaining three lines 
in each quartile reports the sub-classificat ions for fleeting and non-fleeting revisions and cancellation, by the 
location of limit  order price, relative to the same-side best bid or offer p rices (BBO) at the t ime the order was 
submitted. These sub-classifications are: (a) ahead BBO, (a) at BBO, and (c) behind of BBO. For example, ahead of 
BBO, for a buy (sell) order means that it was submitted (revised) at a price that is higher (lower) than the best bid 
(ask). Percentages sum vertically to 100% within each category. 
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  Pre-Event Post-Event 
  % Orders Cancelled %  Orders Rev ised % Orders Cancelled %  Orders Rev ised 
MktCap   ≤ 2 sec ≥ 2 sec ≤ 2 sec ≥ 2 sec ≤ 2 sec ≥ 2 sec ≤ 2 sec ≥ 2 sec 
Panel A: Removal of broker IDs  
Q1 
%  Orders   12.40 87.6 8.09 91.91 12.42 87.58 13.03 86.97 
Ahead 12.39 5.98 11.2 8.06 17.26 8.79 18.9 10.98 
At 55.81 46.78 41.1 35.75 53.71 50.49 39.56 45.44 
Behind  31.8 47.24 47.7 56.19 29.03 40.72 41.54 43.58 
 
Q2 
%  Orders   9.54 90.46 6.48 93.52 7.61 92.39 8.40 91.60 
Ahead 7.33 3.67 9.61 6.02 11.27 5.28 11.59 8.84 
At 58.71 43.21 43.09 33.19 55.97 49.96 41.14 42.93 
Behind  33.96 53.12 47.3 60.79 32.76 44.76 47.27 48.23 
 
Q3 
%  Orders   4.93 95.07 3.62 96.38 6.15 93.85 5.4 94.6 
Ahead 4.54 0.91 1.18 1.96 5.76 0.9 9.07 3.76 
At 59.71 43.21 43.15 31.45 51.71 49.45 42.77 39.2 
Behind  35.75 55.88 55.67 66.59 42.53 49.65 48.16 57.04 
 
Q4 
%  Orders   2.96 97.04 1.4 98.6 3.79 96.21 4.4 95.6 
Ahead 0.61 0.79 0.40 0.98 1.93 0.65 5.07 2.16 
At 61.56 41.32 41.71 30.83 50.18 48.79 45.89 37.17 
Behind  37.83 57.89 57.89 68.19 47.89 50.56 49.04 60.67 
  
Panel B: Price structure change  
 
Q1 
%  Orders   29.05 70.95 32.32 67.68 31.46 68.54 38.32 61.68 
Ahead 21.95 14.19 29.1 16.17 26.56 16.35 37.98 18.28 
At 48.83 44.47 33.67 40.75 50.68 46.87 26.21 47.65 
Behind  29.22 41.34 37.23 43.08 22.76 36.78 35.81 34.07 
 
Q2 
%  Orders   27.94 72.06 23.86 76.14 30.41 69.59 28.65 71.35 
Ahead 16.95 9.96 21.67 12.2 19.46 13.24 29.11 13.67 
At 52.16 42.28 40.23 41.43 53.78 47.09 33.02 48.52 
Behind  30.89 47.76 38.1 46.37 26.76 39.67 37.87 37.81 
 
Q3 
%  Orders   26.2 73.8 20.75 79.25 30.1 69.9 27.56 72.44 
Ahead 11.29 6.04 17.17 11.25 11.89 9.12 19.09 9.25 
At 43.45 43.67 43.5 48.31 57.55 50.67 39.87 51.95 
Behind  45.26 50.29 39.33 40.44 30.56 40.21 41.04 38.8 
 
Q4 
%  Orders   24.49 75.51 19.58 80.42 26.47 73.53 25.37 74.63 
Ahead 6.17 2.24 13.18 9.28 6.37 4.08 14.08 7.31 
At 41.76 42.78 46.17 52.31 57.2 49.36 41.43 50.67 
Behind  52.07 54.98 40.65 38.41 36.43 46.56 44.49 42.02 
 
 
Turning to Panel B, the results are as follows; a) for large market capitalisation stocks, fleeting 
cancellation are mostly placed at-the-market, which increases by approximately 2% from before- to after- 
the price structure change. For example, after the price structure change, large market capitalisation 
stocks show that 51% of fleeting cancellations take place at-the-market, whereas small market 
capitalisation stocks show 57%, b) interestingly, before the price structure change, 37% of fleeting 
revisions are placed behind-the-market.  
Overall, the results show that the percentage of fleeting revisions that are place ahead-of-the-market 
increases, after both market structure changes. In particular, after the market structure change, fleeting 
revisions are mostly placed ahead-of-the market. Hasbrouck and Saar (2009, p.155) explain that 
“submitting a limit order at a slightly better price could be motivated by the desire to obtain price priority 
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(i.e., jump to the head of the queue), or it could indicate a search for hidden orders whereby the searcher 
first tries the most favourable price”. 
 
Multinomial Logit Analysis 
Table 6 reports the base case and the difference in probabilities between the base case and the shifted 
case. The explanatory variables, lagged volume and volatility can be interpreted as follows; if the 
probability of fleeting revisions and cancelations are positively related to an increase in lagged volume or 
volatility then, fleeting revisions and cancellations behave similarly to market orders that demands 
liquidity. Relative spread on the other hand, can be interpreted as follow; a wider spread means that the 
probability of fleeting orders (i.e. cancellations and revisions) increase because there are more price 
points at which to search for latent liquidity inside the spread. (e.g. Hasbrouck and Saar ,2009, p158). 
Spread, lagged volume and lagged absolute return are standardized within each firm to have a zero 
mean and unit variance. The inclusion of the firm-dummies ensures that the average within stock 
residuals is effectively zero.   
The results in Panel A, for limit order submission to the subsequent event (i.e. fleeting execution, 
cancellation or revision) are as follows:  
a) The effect of an increase in lagged volume and volatility: for large market capitalisation 
stocks, the probability of regular limit orders decreases by 0.0473% and 0.0827%, 
respectively. The probability of market order decreases by 0.0444% and 0.0891%, 
respectively. The probability of fleeting executions, revisions, cancellations marginally 
increases. Small market capitalisation stocks show similar results, but the probability shifts 
are smaller.   
b) The effect of an increase in the prevailing spread: for large market capitalisation stocks, the 
probability of regular limit orders and market orders increases by approximately 0.1087% and 
0.0473%, respectively. The probability of fleeting executions, revisions, cancellations 
marginally decreases. For small market capitalisation stocks, a wider spread, leads to a lower 
probability in fleeting executions and cancellations and a higher probability in fleeting 
revisions and market orders. 
 
The results in Panel A, for limit order revisions to the subsequent event are as follows:  
a) The effect of an increase in lagged volume and volatility: for large market capitalisation 
stocks, the probability of regular limit order revision marginally decreases.  The probability 
of fleeting executions, revisions and cancellations increases. From these, the probability of 
fleeting revisions mostly increases by 0.0029% and 0.0025%, respectively. 
b) The effect of an increase in the prevailing spread: for large market capitalisation stocks, the 
probability of regular limit order and fleeting executions decreases by approximately 
0.0056% and 0.0005%.  The probability of fleeting revisions and cancellations increases by 
approximately 0.0005% and 0.0003%. 
 
In summary, the results in Panel A suggest that a) limit order revisions that are subsequently revised 
(within 2 seconds) mostly behave like market orders that demands liquidity, and b) the effect of an 
increase in the prevailing spread  marginally increases the probability of limit orders revisions that are 
subsequently revised and cancelled (within 2 seconds). 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) explains that the increased probability of fleeting orders, in the presence 
of a wider spreads is in line with the search hypothesis, were a limit order seeking latent liquidity 
achieves either a hidden execution, a rapid execution, or is quickly cancelled. Before and after the 
implementation of the removal of broker IDs, undisclosed orders was not yet an active order type, hence, 
there was no need to search for latent liquidity. Furthermore, consistent with results in Table 4, after the 
removal of broker IDs, the probability of execution decreases and probability of fleeting revisions 
increases.  
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The results in Panel B, for limit order submission to the subsequent event are as follows:  
a) The effect of an increase in lagged volume and volatility: large market capitalisation stocks 
show the probability of regular limit orders marginally decrease. The probability of fleeting 
executions, revisions, cancellations and market orders increases. Small market capitalisation 
stocks show that the probability for regular limit orders decreases whereas, market orders, 
fleeting execution, revisions and cancellations increases.  
b) The effect of an increase in the prevailing spread: large market capitalisation stocks show that 
the probability of regular limit orders and market orders decreases, whilst the probability of 
fleeting executions, revisions, cancellations increases.  
The results in Panel B, for limit order revisions to the subsequent event are as follows:  
a) The effect of an increase in lagged volume and volatility: large market capitalisation stocks 
show similar results, whereby the effect of an increase in lagged volume and volatility 
decreases the probability of regular limit orders. Consistent with the previous results, the 
probability of fleeting revisions mostly increased by approximately 0.0047% and 0.0021%, 
respectively. 
b) The effect of an increase in the prevailing spread: The probability of fleeting revisions and 
executions increase by approximately 0.0131% and 0.0132 %.   
 
In summary, the results in Panel B suggest that a) limit order revisions that are subsequently revised 
mostly behave like market orders that demands liquidity, and b) the effect of an increase in the prevailing 
spread mostly increases the probability of limit orders revisions that are subsequently revised. This 
evidence supports the proposition that fleeting revisions might be used to search for latent liquidity inside 
the spread. Overall, these results are consistent with a meaningful partition of the limit order set, i.e., that 
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Duration Model for Limit Order Cancellation and Revisions 
The duration model examines how the market conditions affect the subsequent choice after a limit 
order is submitted or revised. Hasbrouck and Saar (2009, p.160) explains that the drivers behind these 
rapid cancellations depend on what happens to the best price immediately after the submission. In fact 
both the chase and cost-of-immediacy hypotheses, specifically state that fleeting orders are a by-product 
of dynamic strategies that involve order revision in response to changing market conditions. The 
proportional hazards duration model with time-varying covariates is estimated separately for each stock 
before and after each market structure change. 
Table 7 reports the mean and median of the coefficients’ estimates for large (Q1) and small (Q4) 
market capitalisation stocks. Each quartile comprise of twenty stocks, which is a size-stratified subsample 
of 80 from among 200 stocks. To evaluate the strength of the results t-tests are reported for the mean and 
median coefficients. This takes into account the cross-sectional variability of the estimated coefficients. In 
addition, the numbers of positive and negative coefficients as well as the number of statistically 
significant positive and negative coefficients are reported.  
Panel A and B reports the results before and after the removal of broker IDs. These are as follows: a) 
for large market cap stocks, before and after the removal of broker IDs, the coefficients for lagged 
absolute return, volume and the prevailing spread are positive. In particular, for large market 
capitalisation stocks, after the removal of broker IDs, 11 out of 18, 9 out of 16 and 7 out of 15 coefficients 
are positive and statistically significant for lagged return, lagged volume and relative spread, respectively, 
b) large and small market capitalisation stocks, before and after the removal of broker IDs show that 
multiple fleeting orders arise  may be used as part of a dynamic strategy or that fleeting orders arise as a 
result of previous fleeting orders.  
Turning to the three hypotheses the results are as follows:  
 
H1.1: (Chase hypothesis). If the chasing effect is visible, the mean coefficient , ,
Same
i j tq∆  is 
expected to be positive. This implies that the probability of a fleeting buy (sell) revision 
should increase if the same-side BBO goes up (down) because traders revise their limit 
orders at more aggressive prices to seek immediate execution.  
 
Before the removal of broker IDs, the results show no evidence that supports the chase hypothesis, for 
both large and small market capitalisation stocks. However, after the removal of broker IDs, large market 
capitalisation stocks show evidence in favour of the chase hypothesis where 11 out of 13 coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant.  
 
H1.2: (Cost-of-immediacy hypothesis).  If fleeting orders are used to switch from a limit 
order to a market order, the mean coefficient sin, ,Oppo gi j tq∆  is expected to be negative. For 
example, a negative mean coefficient implies that for a buy order, if the ask moves down 
after submission or revision, fleeting cancellation intensity increases. 
 
Before and after the removal of broker IDs, the results show no evidence supporting the cost-of-
immediacy hypothesis, for both large and small market capitalisation stocks.   
 
H1.3: (Search hypothesis).  If fleeting orders are used to search for latent liquidity, the 
mean coefficient , Relativei jp  is expected to be positively related to a higher (lower) limit 
order price for a buy (sell) order. This implies that the probability of fleeting revisions 
should be higher, for more aggressive orders.   
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Before and after the removal of broker IDs, the results show no evidence that supports the search 
hypothesis, for both large and small market capitalisation stocks. For example, before the removal of 
broker IDs, the mean coefficient , Relativei jp  is -8.576, where 3 out of 15 coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant. After the removal of broker IDs, the mean coefficient is -1.523, where 2 out of 11 
coefficients are negative and statistically significant. 
The results in Panel A and B show that after the removal of broker IDs traders pursue a dynamic 
strategy in which they revise limit orders as the market moves away from the original limit order.  
Panel C and D reports the results before and after the price structure change. The results are as 
follows; a) Large market capitalisation stocks, before and after the price structure change show a positive 
mean coefficient for lagged return, lagged volume and relative spread. For example, after the price 
structure change, 12 out of 16, 14 out of 19 and 9 out of 13 coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant for lagged return, lagged volume and relative spread, respectively, b) large and small market 
capitalisation stocks, before and after the price structure  change show that multiple fleeting orders arise  
may be used as part of a dynamic strategy or that fleeting orders arise as a result of previous fleeting 
orders. For example, before the price structure change the mean coefficient for #Fleeting orders is 0.1634, 
were 11 out of 15 are positive and significant. After the price structure change the mean coefficient for 
#Fleeting orders is 0.1247, were 13 out of 17 are positive and significant.  
Turning to the three hypotheses the results are as follows:  
 
H1.1: (Chase hypothesis)  
 
The results show supporting evidence for this hypothesis, before and after the price structure change. 
For example before the price structure change the mean coefficient is 1.2548, were 7 out of 15 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant. After the price structure change the mean coefficient 
is 1.3973 were 11 out of 18 coefficients are positive and statistically significant. 
 
H1.2: (Cost-of-immediacy hypothesis)   
 
The results show supporting evidence for this hypothesis, before and after the price structure change. 
For example before the price structure change the mean coefficient is -0.1248, were 8 out of 13 
coefficients are negative and statistically significant. After the price structure change the mean coefficient 
is -0.1453 were 11 out of 15 coefficients are negative and statistically significant. 
 
H1.3: (Search hypothesis)   
 
The results show supporting evidence for this hypothesis, after the price structure change. For 
example, after the price structure change the mean coefficient is 0.0657 were 7 out of 12 coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant. 
The results in Panel C and D show, that after the price structure change, fleeting orders are used to 
search for latent liquidity and traders more often switch from a limit order to a market order. Supporting 
evidence of the search hypothesis is particular interesting, because this confirms that fleeting orders are 
used to search for latent liquidity with the introduction of undisclosed orders.  
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) , offers another explanation, as oppose to the proposition that, fleeting 
order increase as traders cancels limit orders because it become cheaper to demand than to supply 
liquidity. For example, the trader could interprets a drop in the ask as a signal of new negative private 
information, therefore cancellations is a response to a perceived increase in information asymmetry.  
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) pointed out that the tests that are used to evaluate the strength of the 
results assumes that the sample durations are independent over time and across firms. Following, 
Hasbrouck (2008) the validity of this assumption is examined using the estimated (martingale) residuals 
for large and small market capitalisation pre and post each market structure change. To assess the 
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independence across firms, the average within-stock first-order correlation is calculated. To assess the 
independence across time, hourly mean residual are constructed and the correlations between all pairs of 
stocks are computed.  
After the removal of broker IDs the average within-stock first-order correlation for large and small 
market capitalisations is approximately 0.011 and 0.019, respectively. After the price structure change the 
average within-stock first-order autocorrelation for large and small market capitalisations is 
approximately 0.009 and 0.0016, respectively. The average correlation before the removal of broker IDs 
for large and small market capitalisation stocks is 0.008 and 0.012, respectively. After the price structure 
change the average correlation for large and small market capitalisation stocks is 0.005 and 0.009, 




This paper presents empirical evidence on fleeting order activity and their role in the trading process 
around two market structure changes in ASX. These are the removal of broker IDs and a price structure 
change for exchange fees. The major findings are summarised as follows: 
a) The percentage of limit orders that are fully executed decreases after both market structure 
changes. This results is consistent with Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) that find a low fill rate for 
INET and explain that this indicates the importance to recognise new ways in which trading and 
order choices have changed due to technology, active trading, fragmentation, and latent liquidity.  
b) Large market capitalisation stocks, in both market structure changes show that the most probably 
event 2 seconds after a limit order is submitted or revised is a subsequent revision.  This confirms 
that traders who arrive at the market uncertain of its state quickly learn its true state by placing a 
limit order and watching the evolution of the market. If the uncertainty is quickly resolved, limit 
orders are quickly cancelled or revised. Furthermore, after the price structure change, limit order 
executions are the least probably event. 
c) Large market capitalisation stocks, after both market structure changes show that fleeting 
cancellations are mostly placed at-the-market. After the removal of broker IDs, fleeting revisions 
are mostly placed behind-the-market. However, the percentage of fleeting revisions that are 
placed ahead-of-the-market increases by a significant amount. This confirms that after the 
removal of broker IDs, fleeting revisions are more aggressively than before the removal of broker 
IDs. Before the price structure change fleeting revisions are mostly placed behind-the-market and 
after the price structure change are mostly placed ahead-of-the-market.  
d) The multinomial model suggests that the behaviour of fleeting orders (i.e. revisions and 
cancellations) is different from regular limit order submissions or revisions.  In particular, large 
market capitalisation stocks, for both market structure changes, show that limit order revisions 
that are subsequently revised behave similar to market orders that demands liquidity.  In 
particular, the evidence before and after the price structure change suggests that fleeting revisions 
might be used to search for latent liquidity inside the spread.   
e) The hypothesis tested concludes three main results. The first, after the removal of broker IDs 
traders pursue a dynamic strategy in which they revise limit orders as the market moves away 
from the original limit order.  The second, after the price structure change, fleeting orders are 
used to search for latent liquidity within the spread. The third, after the price structure change, 
traders more often switch from a limit order to a market order as it becomes cheaper to demand 
than to supply liquidity.  
 
Overall, the evidence in this paper suggests that traders do pursue dynamic order placement 
strategies, whereby they actively monitor limit orders. This is also consistent with Liu (2009), that 
suggest, alleviating the risk of being picked-off or the risk of non-execution, traders can monitor the 
market and cancel or revise orders accordingly. Therefore,  a theoretical order choice model that 
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incorporates the limit order decision to cancel or revise will improve the understanding of order dynamics 
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